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Foreword 
From the early 1990s through today, controversies about public spending on elementary and 
secondary education have grown as states have adopted performance standards pledging that 
every child will learn enough to become an independent productive citizen and as No Child Left 
Behind has put teeth in these expectations. Some educators say that meeting higher standards 
requires more money. Others claim that existing resources are sufficient to pay for higher 
performance, if only funds were used more productively. While plaintiffs have asked courts to 
determine what amount of spending is adequate to get students to standards, analysts of various 
stripes have argued that greater expenditures alone will not lead to better results. Moreover, 
critics of demands for more money point to cases in states and cities where major spending 
increases were misspent, with little or no impact on student learning. Though no one seriously 
argues that more spending could never lead to school improvement, there is compelling evidence 
that without changes in the way resources are distributed, used, and accounted for Americans 
could end up with a more expensive, but not necessarily more effective, public education system.   
In this environment, governors and state legislators particularly have asked two questions: 
How much money will it take for all students to meet standards? And how should the money be 
spent to ensure that result? The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation asked the Center on 
Reinventing Public Education (CRPE) to create a School Finance Redesign Project (SFRP) to 
help elected officials, practitioners, and the public better understand how education finance 
systems now work and to identify new options for deploying K-12 resources to support state and 
national educational goals. Initiated in 2003, the project has grown to include more than 30 
separate analyses. 
SFRP was designed to address five questions: 
 Are public education funds now focused on student learning? If not, what stands 
in the way?   
 Are there good ideas about potentially more focused and effective uses of funds to 
promote student learning? 
 Are there good ideas about better ways to spend money to attract and reward 
quality educators? 
 Do we know enough now to say exactly how much money is needed to bring all 
children up to standards and to say how money should be spent? 
 What can policymakers do to ensure that the “right amount” of money is 
distributed equitably, used productively, and accounted for meaningfully? 
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This study by Anthony Milanowski, Hope Longwell-Grice, Janice Jones, Allan Odden, and 
Kristen Schomisch addresses the third question by exploring how incentives help recruit new 
teachers to urban school districts. The topic is important because of the difficulty these districts 
face in attracting and retaining quality teachers. Analysts laud incentives as a way to counteract 
this difficulty, but before decision makers can craft incentives that work, they need better 
information about the types and levels of inducements that influence teachers’ job choices. 
Milanowski and colleagues examine this issue in depth, investigating the job preferences of 
teachers-in-training. Their combination of up-close and survey work allowed them to better 
understand how new teachers assess potential jobs, thus how incentives might motivate them to 
accept placements in high-needs schools. 
Specifically, Milanowski and colleagues were able to estimate the average importance that 
new teachers assign to starting pay, student characteristics, and working conditions, such as a 
principal’s reputation, curriculum flexibility, and support for new teachers. As a result, their 
analysis reveals the types of incentives new teachers favor, how they value monetary rewards 
versus working conditions, and how they make tradeoffs among job characteristics. These results 
also indicate how teachers-in-training find out about job openings and job characteristics, and the 
degree to which new teacher mobility plays into these considerations. While these findings, in 
part, reinforce policy assumptions about the effect of incentives on job selection, they also offer 
some surprising insights regarding the role of salary and student characteristics in new teachers’ 
work considerations. This information helps decision makers better understand how incentives 
can influence teachers’ job choices, the relative cost effectiveness of different incentives, and the 
need to tailor incentives to local labor markets, all of which moves the field toward the greater 
likelihood of supplying urban schools with the teachers they need. 
 
Jacob Adams 
Claremont Graduate University 
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Introduction 
Many urban districts have difficulty attracting and retaining quality teachers, yet they are 
often the most in need of them. Across the country, states and districts are experimenting with 
financial incentives to attract and retain high quality teachers in high-need, low-achieving, or 
hard to staff urban schools (Murphy and DeArmond 2003). Incentives are a logical policy option 
because tradition, union contracts, and the structure of teacher labor markets prevent simply 
reassigning the best teachers to schools with the highest need. Incentives have included signing 
bonuses, pay supplements (“combat pay”), loan forgiveness, tuition subsidies, and housing 
assistance. Two prominent examples are Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina, and Miami-
Dade, Florida. The U.S. federal government is now encouraging states and districts to provide 
incentives. Under a $99 million Congressional appropriation, the Department of Education has 
awarded Teacher Incentive Fund grants aimed at providing additional money for recruitment, 
retention, and performance incentives for teachers in high-need schools (defined as more than 30 
percent poverty) (U.S. Dept of Education 2006).  
Relatively little is known, however, about how effective financial incentives are likely to be 
to attract and retain teachers in high-need urban schools. The purpose of this research is to add to 
our knowledge of how teachers are likely to respond to incentives. Focusing on teachers in 
training, our research was aimed at finding out more about how they make job choices, what they 
perceive as important about districts and schools in the context of their future job choice, and 
how much of a financial incentive would be needed to motivate them to take a job in a high-need 
district or school.  
Incentives and Teacher Attraction 
The basic assumption behind the use of financial incentives to attract teachers to high-need 
districts and schools is that the incentives provide a compensating differential for potentially 
unattractive job characteristics associated with poverty, low student achievement, and racial or 
ethnic differences. Despite persistent arguments that teachers are not motivated by money, 
research supports the conclusion that higher pay improves teacher retention (Guarino, 
Santibañez, Daley, and Brewer 2004). There is also some evidence that higher salaries improve 
the quality of new teachers attracted to a district (e.g., Figlio 2002; Manski 1987).  
However, there are features of the teacher labor market that may limit the effectiveness of 
incentives. First, many teachers seem to prefer to teach in a school close to their community of 
origin (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff 2003). Second, teacher labor markets may be 
segmented based on ethnicity, teacher training program completed, and qualifications. Burian-
Fitzgerald and Anagnostopulos (2005) found that new teachers’ ethnicity and perceptions of their 
own qualifications influenced the jobs for which they considered applying. This suggests that 
districts may have to compete for a local supply of new teachers and that in the short run that 
supply is relatively fixed.  
There may also be other job characteristics that are more important than compensation in 
attracting teachers. Research on teacher turnover has identified several influential factors 
important to teachers choosing schools. These include administrator support  (Loeb, Darling-
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Hammond, and Luczak 2005; Johnson and Birkeland 2003, Ingersoll 2001; Weiss 1999), the 
presence of induction programs (Smith and Ingersoll 2004), collegial support (Johnson and 
Birkeland 2003), class size (Ingersoll 2003; Kirby, Berends, and Naftel 1999), teacher autonomy 
or involvement in decisionmaking (Weiss 1999; Ingersoll 2003), and school facilities (Buckley, 
Schnieder, and Shang 2004). Johnson, Berg, and Donaldson (2005) argued, based on Rosenholtz 
(1989), that parent and community involvement could also impact retention via improving 
teacher efficacy. Many of these factors are likely to be considered along with pay, location, and 
student characteristics when teachers judge whether a financial incentive would make teaching in 
a high-need school more attractive.  
While it seems reasonable to assume that teachers make trade-offs between pay and a variety 
of other job characteristics, including location, student characteristics, and working conditions, 
there is little research that addresses either how teachers make these trade-offs or how much of a 
financial incentive would be needed to make high-need schools more attractive. Econometric 
studies using pay variation among districts (e.g., Hanushek, Cain, and Rivkin 2005; Imazeki 
2000) have suggested that financial incentives might have to be relatively large. However, these 
studies are limited by the range of variation in salaries typically found in local teacher labor 
markets and the confounding of district ability to pay, community tastes for education, and 
teacher bargaining power with teacher salaries and working conditions (Loeb and Page 1998). 
Few studies of specific incentive programs have been conducted. A small study by Bruno and 
Negrete (1983) found that extra pay was not effective in recruiting and retaining teachers in high 
poverty schools within a district. On the other hand, a more recent study by Clotfelter, Glennie, 
Ladd, and Vigdor (2006) found that a moderately-sized addition to salary ($1,800) was effective 
in encouraging mid-career and more senior math and science teachers to stay in high-needs 
districts in North Carolina. Clearly, far more research is needed on the potential effectiveness of 
financial incentives given the current interest in them as an intervention to improve teacher 
quality in high-need schools.  
To provide more information about the potential effect of financial incentives and other job 
characteristics on new teachers’ job choices, this research addresses three questions: 
1. What incentives might be expected to attract new teachers to high-need schools? 
2. What is the relative value new teachers place on financial incentives and working 
conditions? 
3. How much of a salary incentive would be needed to attract new teachers to high-
needs schools? 
Method 
This research used a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. It began with focus 
groups at three teacher training institutions. The purpose of the groups was to collect information 
on the job characteristics new teachers are likely to look for, to understand why they view 
schools and districts as attractive or unattractive choices, and to provide background information 
for the development of a survey. The survey was intended to collect information about student 
preferences for a smaller set of job characteristics, including various levels of beginning salary, 
allowing a quantitative estimate of the relative value new teachers place on these job 
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characteristics, and the beginning salary level that would be needed to attract new teachers to 
high-needs schools. 
Focus Groups 
Three focus groups were held at one large urban public university, one at a small private 
urban university, and three at a large public university in a university town. The groups were 
conducted in the spring of 2006. All the institutions were located in the southern part of 
Wisconsin. Forty students participated. The participants were typically in their final year of 
training and would be seeking jobs soon. They were 78 percent female, 25 percent people of 
color, and the average age was 23.6 years. The focus group sessions were conducted by a trained 
facilitator, and recordings of the proceedings were transcribed. Transcripts were independently 
content analyzed by multiple researchers to identify themes related to job choice and attractive 
and unattractive job characteristics. The researchers were easily able to agree on key themes. 
Survey 
 Based on the results of the focus groups, and on job characteristics found important for 
teacher retention by prior research, a survey was designed to be administered to students at three 
teacher training institutions. The survey collected information on where the students intended to 
apply, what attracts them to different districts, and the tradeoffs they make in deciding to apply 
for jobs with different levels of pay, working conditions, and student characteristics. The heart of 
the survey was a section asking respondents to rate the attractiveness of jobs characterized by 
different combinations of pay, working conditions and school student demographic composition. 
Information about five job characteristics was provided for each hypothetical job: starting pay 
level (four levels, $32,000, $37,000, $42,000 and $47,000 for a 191 day contract), the reputation 
of the principal for understanding teaching and establishing supportive relationships with 
teachers, the presence or absence of a new teacher induction program, curriculum flexibility 
(highly structured versus highly flexible), and the ethnic composition of the school (either 75 
percent Caucasian, 15 percent African American, and 10 percent Hispanic or 75 percent African 
American, 15 percent Hispanic, and 10 percent Caucasian). The jobs were all described as being 
in an urban district with 160 schools; a student population that is 63 percent African-American, 
20 percent Caucasian, and 17 percent Hispanic; and 65 percent of the students qualifying for free 
or reduced price lunch. We used this frame because we wanted to see if within an urban district 
incentives for high-need schools would affect potential job choice. We used the percent African-
American and Hispanic to operationalize high-needs schools within the hypothetical urban 
district. We considered using poverty and student achievement but chose ethnic status since this 
is often highly correlated with these other indicators and may be more salient to the 
predominantly Caucasian student sample we expected. 
  These job characteristics were varied across the 64 job descriptions needed to cover all 
combinations of the 5 factors (64 = 4 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2). However, to prevent respondent fatigue 
and maximize the chances of respondents completing the survey, only eight job descriptions 
were presented to each respondent, entailing the use of a balanced incomplete block design for 
structuring the set of characteristics presented (Graham and Cable 2001). Thus there were eight 
versions of the survey, reflecting the eight blocks of the design. Within each block, the eight job 
descriptions were presented at random. The survey also contained items asking about the age, 
gender, ethnic heritage, grade point average, major, and perceived level of preparation of each 
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respondent, as well as questions about the type of district in which they were educated (rural, 
urban, suburban) and the districts in which they had done student teaching. After responding to 
the demographic and background items, respondents were asked to read each of the eight job 
descriptions and answer two questions about each job: “Would you apply for this job?”  (yes or 
no) and “How likely is it that you would accept this job if it was offered to you?” (a response 
scale with 11 categories labeled “0 percent,” “10 percent”… up to “100 percent” was provided).  
 The survey was pre-tested with eight students preparing to be teachers. After responding 
to the survey, they were interviewed about how they understood the questions, difficulties they 
had responding, survey length, and whether they would be willing to respond over the Internet or 
in a class without compensation. The pre-test suggested that the survey would take 15 to 20 
minutes to complete. These eight students were compensated for their participation, but those 
participating in the main data collection were not. Based on this pre-test, a number of minor 
changes were made to the survey.  
The surveys were administered primarily in paper and pencil form, in classes enrolling 
students completing their student teaching. Some surveys were administered over the Internet. 
Most of the respondents were students in their last semester of their teacher preparation program 
at one of the three universities. Surveys were administered in November/December of 2006, and 
January/February of 2007. All respondents were promised confidentiality, and those responding 
to the paper and pencil version did so anonymously. Response rates were over 95 percent for the 
paper and pencil administrations but only 13 percent for the Internet administration. When 
considering response rates, it should be born in mind that for the paper and pencil 
administrations, students absent from class the day of the administration are not counted and we 
took a convenience sample of class sections, based on the willingness of the instructor to give 
time for survey administration. Data were analyzed using various regression-based, policy-
capturing analysis techniques (Cooksey 1996).  
Results 
Focus Groups  
Analyses of the focus group data suggested that:  
1. Many students, even relatively late in their preparation, are not committed to a 
particular district and are willing to consider many possibilities, including those 
with high-need schools. A substantial number had not yet given much thought to 
the question of which specific districts were of interest to them.  
2. Students from the large urban area preferred to stay in the metropolitan area; 
those from the university in the college town were more mobile.  
3. While pay and benefits were attractive to the students, loan forgiveness and 
subsidies for further education were also attractive.  
4. Small increments of additional salary did not appear as important as other job 
characteristics in making jobs attractive. There were a wide variety of opinions 
expressed about what salary level would be attractive for teaching in an urban 
district. In most of the focus groups, at least one participant noted that salary level 
Working Paper 11  Milanowski et al. 
 10 
was not an important factor in job choice. A substantial minority of participants 
indicated that the salary level given as an example–$32,000–was adequate. On the 
other hand, another substantial minority indicated that this was not an attractive 
salary. When pressed to name an attractive salary, most of these respondents 
mentioned salaries in the $40,000-50,000 range.  
5. Other school and district attributes mentioned as attractive included: 
o District/school mission and values and the “trajectory” of the district – is it 
moving forward? 
o Challenge  
o Family/community support 
o Resources 
o Principal-teacher relationships 
o Teacher-teacher relationships 
o Curricular flexibility and teacher autonomy 
6. Students find out about many of these attributes during field placements or 
student teaching (e.g., from teachers they talk to). Another important way students 
find out about jobs and districts in which they might be interested is word-of-
mouth, via contacts with fellow students, relatives, former teachers, and friends. 
Many students did not appear to have done much searching for schools or districts 
that might be attractive. Many seemed to fall back on the districts they themselves 
attended, or schools and districts where they did field placements (typically those 
close to their teacher training program).   
Survey 
 Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample of the 218 students who provided usable 
responses to the survey. 
 
Table 1. Respondent Characteristics 
Percent Female 84% 
Percent White 86% 
Average Age 26 years 
Median GPA category 3.6-4.0 
Percent preparing for middle or elementary teaching 85% 
Percent math/science/special education 7% 
Percent attending large public urban university  56% 
Percent attending small private urban university 22% 
Percent attending large public non-urban university  22% 
Percent last attending school in urban district 26%* 
Percent last attending school in suburban district 57%* 
Percent last attending school in rural district 12%* 
*Percentages do not add to 100 due to item non-response 
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There were, on the average, 27.3 respondents for each of the eight blocks (versions) of the 
survey.  
The first set of analyses simply estimated the average importance of the five job 
characteristics in respondent job choice decisions. First, logistic regression was used to model 
the probability of a respondent saying he or she would apply for each job as a function of the five 
job characteristics. Second, OLS was used to model the probability of accepting the job if 
offered given by the respondents, as a function of the five job characteristics. Table 2 shows the 
results of these analyses. 
 
Table 2. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Representing Importance of 
Job Characteristics in Job Choice 
Job Characteristic Odds Ratio OLS Regression 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Beginning Salary ($1,000s)    1.05**    0.74** 0.08 
Principal     4.37**  17.32** 1.22 
Induction Program    2.15**    9.40** 0.75 
Curricular Flexibility    2.03**  10.03** 1.10 
Low % African American + Hispanic  1.01  0.27 1.03 
OLS Intercept  43.39 1.98 
R2  0.21  
n=218 participants; standard errors adjusted for clustering of jobs within respondents  
** Significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. 
 
There are three points to note about the results shown in Table 1. First, both the logistic and 
OLS analyses show that the principal’s reputation has a large influence on hypothetical job 
choice. A principal with a reputation for understanding teaching and learning and establishing 
supportive relationships with teachers increases the odds of the average respondent saying they 
would apply by a factor of more than 4 and increases the reported probability of job acceptance 
by 17 percentage points. In comparison, a $5,000 increase in starting salary improves the odds of 
the average respondent saying they would apply by a factor of about 0.25, and increases the 
reported probability of job acceptance by a bit less than 4 percentage points (5 times 0.74). 
The second point of interest is that, in this sample of respondents, whether the school’s 
student body was high or low in the percentage of African American and Hispanic students 
seemed to have little effect on hypothetical job choice.  
The third notable result is that, because of the relatively small size of the coefficient for 
percent African American and Hispanic, these students do not appear to require much of a 
“compensating differential” to teach in school with the high proportion of students of color. 
Given that the difference in likelihood of job acceptance between a high African American and 
Hispanic school and the low one increases by only 0.27 percentage points, while increasing base 
pay by $1,000 increases the likelihood of job acceptance by 0.74 percentage points, the 
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compensating differential needed to equalize the likelihood between the latter and the former 
schools is estimated at only $365 (0.27 divided by 0.74 times $1,000). 
The low R2 value for the OLS regression suggests that there may be substantial differences 
among participant in their valuation of the job characteristics. To investigate this possibility, we 
conducted additional analyses. First, we did the logistic and OLS analyses separately for students 
from each of the teacher training institutions. We did this because it is likely that each attracts a 
different type of student, and each may prepare the students differently.1 The large public urban 
university also has a close relationship with its local urban district. The results are shown in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Logistic and OLS Regression Coefficients Representing Importance of 
Job Characteristics in Job Choice, by Teacher Training Institution 
 Job Characteristic Large Public Urban Small Private 
Urban 
Large Public 
Non-urban 
 Odds 
Ratio 
OLS B Odds 
Ratio 
OLS B Odds 
Ratio 
OLS B 
Beginning Salary 
($1,000s) 
1.04** 0.72**   1.07** 0.70** 1.08* 0.81** 
Principal  3.86**  17.61**    5.04** 14.87** 8.19** 19.16** 
Induction Program 2.43**   9.14**    1.49** 8.80** 3.30** 10.63** 
Curricular Flexibility 2.15**   10.63** 1.30 5.43** 2.96** 13.91** 
Low % African 
American + Hispanic  
0.94  -1.22        1.66 6.47**  0.85 -1.67 
OLS Intercept      45.36    44.59    35.88 
 N  122  49  47 
 R2       0.23     0.19     0.35 
Standard errors adjusted for clustering of jobs within respondents  
** Significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. 
 
These results suggest that there are some differences in the value placed on the job 
characteristics by students from the different institutions, but they also suggest that principal 
reputation for understanding teaching and learning and establishing supportive relationships is 
the most important factor influencing hypothetical job choice across institutions. Odds ratios and 
OLS regression coefficients for beginning salary level are similar across institutions. The OLS 
intercepts also show that students at the large public non-urban institution are less likely to say 
they would accept the “base level” job, one with a beginning salary of $32,000, at a school with 
a principal who did not have a reputation as supportive, no induction program, a structured 
curriculum, and a high percentage of African American and Hispanic students. These students 
                                                
1 Students from the large urban university were more likely to have attended an urban high school (37% versus 
20-23%)  and those from the small private university were older (average age 32 versus 26 at the large urban and 23 
at the large non-urban). 
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appear to be more influenced by principal support, an induction program, and curricular 
flexibility, especially compared to those attending the small private urban institution. Students at 
both public institutions do not appear, on the average, to be much influenced by school ethnic 
composition, while those at the small private university are more likely to accept a job at a 
school with a lower percent of students of color.  
Second, we estimated a series of two level random-effects models using the ratings of the 
probability of accepting the job as the response variable. The program HLM6 (Raudenbush, 
Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon 2004) was used. At level one, the reported probability for each job 
within respondent was modeled as a function of the job characteristic levels. At level 2 (the 
respondent level), we began by testing whether the job characteristics had different weights 
(slopes) across respondents. We did this by allowing the intercept, and the slopes for the 
characteristics to vary, then assessing the statistical significance of the relevant variance 
components. We found that the variance component for the intercept was significant, and 
relatively large, showing that there were substantial differences in the probability of acceptance 
of the “average” job across respondents (note that all level 1 predictors were centered around 
their grand means). In addition, variance components for random slopes for all of the job 
characteristics were significant. This suggests that there is substantial variation in the importance 
of the job characteristics across respondents.  
Our next step was to attempt to model some of this variation, using information about the 
respondents we had collected in the survey. Based on the OLS results, we included indicators for 
the institution attended as predictors of the random intercepts and slopes. We also hypothesized 
that several demographic characteristics might influence both the overall probability of accepting 
a job in an urban district (the intercept) and the influence of school ethnic composition. These 
included respondent age, ethnic heritage (African American and Hispanic), and whether the 
respondent had attended an urban high school. We also included an indicator for male gender as 
a predictor of the slope for beginning salary, reasoning that males might be more sensitive to 
salary differences. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 4. 
These results show that, as expected, age was a factor influencing the likelihood of accepting 
any of the jobs in the hypothetical urban district (reducing the reported likelihood) and being 
male was associated with a greater sensitivity to pay differences. These effects are relatively 
small, however. Though the small number of African American respondents in the sample 
limited the potential statistical significance, the results are consistent with the idea that these 
respondents would be more likely to accept a job in a school with a high proportion of African 
American students. Consistent with the interpretation we made of the results shown in Table 2, 
the fixed effects coefficients suggest that principal support, the presence of an induction 
program, and curriculum flexibility seem more important than either beginning salary level or 
school ethnic composition, even for respondents who are not African American or Hispanic, and 
for both males and females. Interestingly, the reported likelihood of job acceptance of non-
Hispanic or non-African American respondents attending the public institutions was not related 
to school ethnic composition, while such respondents at the small urban private institution were 
more likely to accept a job at a more “white” school. These results imply that there would be a 
need for a higher beginning salary to offset school ethnic composition only for the latter 
respondents. Given the relatively low estimated effect of beginning salary for this group (0.69-
0.02), a higher beginning salary of about $9,716 would be the estimate of the additional pay 
needed to equalize likelihood of acceptance between low and high African American plus 
Working Paper 11  Milanowski et al. 
 14 
Hispanic schools (6.51 divided by (0.69-0.02) times $1,000). To improve the likelihood of 
acceptance of a job in the urban district at a school with average characteristics2 for the female 
students at the large public non-urban university to the level of the large public urban university, 
the additional beginning salary is predicted to be $9,194 (6.62/(0.69+0.03) times $1,000). For 
males, the estimate would be $5,807 (6.62/(0.69+0.03+0.42) times $1,000).  
 
Table 4. Multi-level Regression Coefficients Representing Importance of Job 
Characteristics and Level 2 Predictors of Random Intercepts and Slopes 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept 67.73** 1.60 
  Age (grand mean centered) -0.43* 0.15 
  Small Private Urban University 1.92 2.74 
  Large Non-urban University -6.62* 2.80 
  African American 0.74 8.30 
  Hispanic 1.88 5.14 
  Attended urban HS 2.50 2.23 
Principal  16.85** 1.59 
  Small Private Urban University -1.70 2.91 
  Large Non-urban University 2.43 3.00 
Induction Program 9.06** 0.99 
  Small Private Urban University -0.02 1.82 
  Large Non-urban University 1.54 1.87 
Curricular Flexibility 10.59** 1.46 
  Small Private Urban University -4.06 2.67 
  Large Non-urban University 3.12 2.75 
Low % African American + Hispanic 0.09 1.58 
  Small Private Urban University 6.51** 2.55 
  Large Non-urban university -0.45 2.70 
  African American -12.24 9.05 
  Hispanic 2.57 5.51 
  Attended urban HS -2.88 2.43 
Beginning salary 0.69** 0.13 
   Age (grand mean centered) -0.00 0.01 
   Male 0.42** 0.21 
   Small Private Urban University -0.02 0.21 
   Large Non-urban university 0.03 0.21 
   Attended urban HS -0.09 0.18 
** Significant at the 0.05 level or beyond. 
                                                
2 Recall that the indicators for the five job characteristics were centered in the analysis producing Table 4.       
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Discussion 
With respect to our research questions, we found both some expected and some unexpected 
results that may be of use to those seeking ways to attract new teachers to urban districts and 
high-need schools. Focus group results suggest that a district might be able to attract mobile 
students by presenting a clear mission, appealing to idealism, and adding incentives like loan 
forgiveness. Second, working conditions seem as important as financial incentives. Third, 
students’ desire for curricular freedom may be in conflict with urban districts’ movement to more 
structured curricula like Success for All or Direct Instruction. Fourth, since much of what new 
teachers know about districts or schools comes via word of mouth, if current teachers are 
satisfied with the district or school, they will help “sell” it to new teachers. Improving working 
conditions for all teachers is therefore likely to help attract new teachers.   
As we expected after the focus groups, survey results suggest that working conditions 
factors, especially principal support, may be more cost effective than higher beginning pay. The 
low sensitivity to pay and the high sensitivity to principal support observed for these respondents 
implies that a district might be better off spending to attract, retain, or train better principals than 
to provide higher beginning salaries to teachers. If, for example, a district wanted to attract new 
teachers from an institution like our large non-urban public university to a high-need school, a 
principal with a reputation for being supportive increases the likelihood of job acceptance by 
over 19 percent (16.85+2.43). To get this effect with a higher base salary would require an 
increase of over $25,000 ((16.85+2.43) divided by (0.69+0.03) times $1,000).   
The importance of the principal to teacher attraction is consistent with results of other 
studies, ranging from surveys that show dissatisfaction with the principal is a frequent reason for 
teachers transferring to other schools (Luekens, Lyter, Fox, and Chandler 2004) to qualitative 
research on preferences of accomplished teachers (Berry and King 2005). The relatively small 
effect of salary differences on job attractiveness is consistent with the results of Hanushek, Cain, 
and Rivkin (2001), who found evidence that working conditions were more important than pay 
differences in mobility decisions of experienced teachers in Texas. The results are less consistent 
with Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, and Vigdor’s (2006) conclusion that a relatively small bonus 
($1,800 per year) for math, science, and special education teachers teaching in high poverty or 
struggling schools reduced turnover by 12%. However, it should be noted that the latter study 
focused on teachers who were already working in such schools. This group may already have 
adjusted to teaching in schools that others find less attractive. It may take substantially more 
money to attract new teachers who may have had little or no experience in such schools or who 
may feel unprepared for the challenges these schools can present.  
 The survey results also remind us that individual differences play a strong role in the 
attractiveness of job characteristics. As expected, the attractiveness of schools with different 
ethnic composition varies with teacher ethnic characteristics, and males are more sensitive to 
pay. These results were expected but do reinforce the point that the level of financial incentive 
likely to be needed to attract new teachers to high-need schools varies with teacher 
characteristics. Some of these characteristics may be highly idiosyncratic, as indicated by the 
statistically significant variance component for the random slope for beginning salary remaining 
even after we introduced slope predictors at level 2.  
One somewhat unexpected result is the relatively low effect of pay. As discussed below, 
some of this could be due to social desirability bias. But we also found in pre-testing the survey 
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that students at the two public institutions perceived that the labor market was in surplus, and, as 
one put it, you take what you can to get your foot in the door. This is consistent with the 
impression that the state containing these institutions overproduces new teachers and anecdotes 
that suggest that many suburban districts have long queues of job applicants. The state’s biggest 
urban district has also reduced its hiring in the past two years due to budget cuts. Under these 
circumstances, it does seem likely that respondents would be less concerned with beginning 
salary.   
The limited effect of school ethnic composition was also surprising. Again, part of this could 
be due to social desirability bias. On the other hand, it is also the case that students from the 
large urban public university know that the biggest employer of teachers in the area is an urban 
district with a high overall proportion of students of color and many schools with very high 
proportions. Given the job market, they may simply be realistic about where the jobs for new 
teachers are located. 
The loose condition of the labor market in the state at the time of our data collection certainly 
weakens the generalizability of our estimates of the beginning salary level needed to attract new 
teachers. This limitation points up the need to tailor incentives to local conditions and suggests 
that it is simplistic to say that financial incentives are or are not effective without considering the 
local teacher labor market.  
Limitations 
It should be noted that this study investigated the preferences of new teachers, and that many 
of the respondents were relatively young. The preferences of experienced teachers, or older 
adults moving into teaching a second career, might be different. Also, although we collected data 
from students at three quite different types of teacher training institutions, the generalizability of 
our results is limited because all of the institutions were located in a state that produces a net 
surplus of teachers. As discussed above, this likely made the respondents less sensitive to 
differences in jobs because when jobs are relatively more scarce job seekers cannot be as 
selective. Yet some job characteristics were still found to be more heavily weighted than others. 
There are two methodological limitations that affect our study.  The first is the difficulty of 
disentangling potential social desirability effects that may have biased the coefficients for 
beginning salary and school ethnic composition downward from other effects. It may be that 
students preparing to be teachers are reluctant to indicate that beginning salaries are important in 
job choice decisions, even on an anonymous survey. It is also possible, as discussed above, that 
these students simply are not as concerned about beginning salaries since they may believe that 
they have to take any entry job and then will have a chance to move to better paying districts 
after obtaining some job experience. It is also possible that, given the emphasis on social justice 
in many teacher preparation programs, Caucasian respondents would be reluctant to show too 
much preference for schools with lower proportions of students of color. Yet it is also possible 
that their training has made some believe they have an obligation to consider teaching in such 
schools. 
The second is the use of a balanced incomplete block design to present the scenarios, in order 
to reduce respondent burden. The grouping of the hypothetical jobs into eight blocks and the 
nesting of participants within blocks prevented exploration of the higher order interactions 
among job characteristics. We could not have all respondents evaluate some of the most 
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interesting combinations, such as those that required trading-off ethnic composition and entry 
salary, with all other characteristics equal. This prevented us from getting a simpler estimate of 
the effect of beginning salary. It also introduces block effects, which while substantively 
negligible in this study, were occasionally statistically significant. The limitation on the number 
of jobs that respondents would consider also forced us to choose one factor, ethnic composition, 
to represent the high-need school construct. Though in this state ethnic composition, poverty, and 
student test scores are highly correlated, it would have been interesting to include a poverty or 
test score factor. This would have at least doubled the number of scenarios to be considered, so 
that respondents would have had to rate twice as many jobs, or required more blocks and thus 
fewer respondents per scenario.   
Future Research Directions  
Though we were not able to provide a completely satisfactory answer to the question of how 
much of a financial incentive would be needed to attract new teachers to high-needs schools, we 
believe that the idea of asking teachers about incentives is still a sound one, and one that should 
be an important part of designing incentive programs. To make this type of research more 
relevant to program designers, it should be done in other states or regions, with different teacher 
labor market conditions, and at more types of teacher training institutions. We also recommend 
that researchers experiment with different descriptions of high-need schools and with different 
designs for capturing teacher job decision trade-offs. For example, instead of a full set of 
scenarios, teachers could be asked to indicate the attractiveness of fewer, but more detailed, 
scenarios varying on fewer dimensions. This would allow a more complete representation of the 
construct of a high-need school. If our finding that new teachers value supportive principals, 
induction programs, and curricular flexibility generalizes, it might be useful to use scenarios that 
focus more on financial incentives, student achievement, and poverty.  
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